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Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size
for positional voting rules under IC behaviour
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Abstract. We consider the problem of manipulation of elections using positional voting rules under Impartial
Culture voter behaviour. We consider both the logical possibility of coalitional manipulation, and the number of
voters that must be recruited to form a manipulating coalition. It is shown that the manipulation problem may
be well approximated by a very simple linear program in two variables. This permits a comparative analysis
of the asymptotic (large-population) manipulability of the various rules. It is seen that the manipulation
resistance of positional rules with 5 or 6 (or more) candidates is quite different from the more commonly
analyzed 3- and 4-candidate cases.
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1. Introduction
In 1973–75 Gibbard and Satterthwaite published a fundamental impossibility theorem which states that every
non-dictatorial social choice function, whose range contains at least three alternatives, at certain profiles can be
manipulated by a single individual voter [6, 15]. After that, the natural question arose: if there are no perfect rules,
which ones are the best, i.e. least manipulable? To this question there can be no absolute answer – it depends both
on the behaviour of the voters, and on the measure used to quantify the term “manipulability”.
Among models of voter behaviour, the following two have gained the most attention ([3,14]). The Impartial
Culture (IC) model assumes that voters are independent, and that each voter is equally likely to vote for any
candidate. The Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) model assumes some degree of dependency. This paper concerns
itself with the IC model.
Among measures of manipulability, the most popular is the probability that the votes fall in such a way as to
create the (coalitional or individual) “logical possibility of manipulation” ([4,7,8,9,12,13,14]). This means that some
coalition of voters (or individual voter) with incentive to do so can change the election result by voting insincerely.
Counterthreats are not considered – we assume that the manipulator(s) are not opposed by the other, naive voters.
The probability of manipulability has been especially well-studied for the important class of positional (scoring)
voting rules, and significant progress has been made in comparing them. In his seminal paper [14], Saari showed
that in his “geometric” model, Borda’s rule is the least manipulable for the three-alternative case in relation to micro
manipulation, but that this does not extend to the case of four alternatives.
In this paper, we further refine this notion of manipulability by considering the sizes of the coalitions involved.
Intuitively, a rule is more resistant to manipulation if many voters must be recruited to assemble the manipulating
coalition, and less resistant if only a few voters are required. We may thus consider the probability that a coalition
of at most k voters can manipulate (k = 1, 2, . . .). Equivalently, we study the probability distribution of the size of
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the smallest manipulating coalition (a random variable). Similar ideas are explored, in a more limited way, in [12]
and [13].
We use the following notation and assumptions throughout. An election is held to choose one from among
m candidates (m ≥ 3). There are n voters, who hold opinions according to the IC model. That is, each voter
(independently) chooses one of the m! possible types (preference orders on the candidates), each type being equally
likely to be chosen. The election uses the positional voting rule with score vector w = (w1, . . . , wm), where 1 =
w1 ≥ w2 ≥ · · · ≥ wm = 0. That is, a vote ranking candidate α in ith place contributes wi to the score of α, and
the candidate with the greatest total score is declared the winner. The possibility of a tie for first place will not be
considered in this paper, as Proposition 3 makes it largely irrelevant; it is discussed in detail in [13]. We aim to
describe the limiting probability distribution of the minimum manipulating coalition size as n→∞, and to use this
as a criterion for comparing the rules.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section records some basic results regarding IC
behaviour in large populations. The long section 3 is the theoretical core of the paper: it defines the manipulation
problem as an integer linear program and then, through a series of simplifications, shows how this may be replaced
by a much simpler linear program. Readers impatient to reach the main results may wish to skip much of this section
at a first reading. The desired limiting probability distributions are derived in section 4, and used in section 5 to
compare the rules. Section 6 contains some conclusions.
2. Asymptotic results for large electorates of IC voters
Let C be the set of candidates, and T the set of all voter types (i.e. all permutations of C). Let N = (Nt)t∈T
be the random vector giving the number of voters of each type (so
∑
t∈T Nt = n). For IC voter behaviour, N has a
multinomial probability distribution with mean (n/m!)1. (Here and subsequently, the notation 1 is used to denote
a vector whose entries are all 1.) Under the asymptotic conditions of interest to us, this may be approximated by a
multivariate normal distribution.
Proposition 1.
N − np1√
n
→D N(0,Σ),
where p = 1/m!, and Σ is the matrix with entries
Σst =
{
p(1− p), if s = t
−p2, if s 6= t .
Remark. Here and in the rest of this paper, the notation →D denotes convergence in distribution (see [5, Ch. 2]).
Note that the limiting multivariate normal distribution is degenerate, being supported on
{
(qt)t∈T :
∑
t∈T qt = 0
}
.
Proof. Since IC voters choose their types at random, and independently, we have N =
∑n
i=1Xi, where X1, . . . , Xn
are independent and have probability distribution assigning probability 1/m! to each of the unit vectors of RT . Note
that E [X1] = p1 and the covariance matrix of X1 is Σ. The result then follows by the central limit theorem ([5,
p.170]).
We use the notation σt(α) for the contribution to candidate α’s score made by a vote of type t (so if t ranks α in
ith place, then σt(α) = wi). The total score of α is then
|α| =
∑
t∈T
Ntσt(α).
Let S = (|α|)α∈C be the vector of candidates’ scores (the “scoreboard”). Proposition 1 immediately gives a central
limit result for S, too.
Proposition 2.
S − nw¯1√
n
→D σw
(
m
m− 1
)1/2
(Z − Z¯1),
where w¯, σw are the mean and standard deviation of the score vector w (i.e. w¯ = (w1 + · · · + wm)/m and σ2w =
(w21 + · · · + w2m)/m − (w¯)2); Z is a vector, indexed by C, of independent standard normal random variables; and
Z¯ = 1m
∑
α Zα.
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Proof. Let Y = (Yt)t∈T ∼ N(0,Σ). From Proposition 1 we have
S − nw¯1√
n
→D U,
where Uα =
∑
t∈T Ytσt(α). It only remains to show that U and σw
(
m
m−1
)1/2
(Z − Z¯1) have the same multivariate
normal distribution. For this, it suffices to observe that they have the same mean (zero), variances, and covariances.
It is routine to check that
Var
(∑
t∈T
Ytσt(α)
)
= σ2w = σ
2
w
(
m
m− 1
)
Var
(
Zα − Z¯
)
for α ∈ C, and for distinct α, β ∈ C
Cov
(∑
t∈T
Ytσt(α),
∑
t∈T
Ytσt(β)
)
=
−σ2w
m− 1 = σ
2
w
(
m
m− 1
)
Cov
(
Zα − Z¯, Zβ − Z¯
)
.
Proposition 2 implies that under IC behaviour in large electorates, the average candidate’s score will be of order
n, but the variability among the scores will be of order only
√
n. Consequently, most elections will result in all
candidates receiving relatively similar scores, and the margin of victory will be small. However, exact ties in the
scores become increasingly rare as the number of voters increases. The following result establishes this formally.
Proposition 3.
P (all candidates’ scores are numerically distinct)→ 1 as n→∞.
Proof. For two distinct candidates α and β, we have
{|α| 6= |β|} =
{
S − nw¯1√
n
∈ G
}
,
where G =
{
s ∈ RC : sα 6= sβ
}
. By Proposition 2 (and [5, p.87]), since G is an open set we have
lim
n
P
(
S − nw¯1√
n
∈ G
)
= P
(
σw
(
m
m− 1
)1/2
(Z − Z¯1) ∈ G
)
= P (Zα 6= Zβ) = 1.
That is, P (|α| = |β|)→ 0 as n→∞. The result follows since
P

⋃
α6=β
{|α| = |β|}

 ≤ ∑
α6=β
P (|α| = |β|) .
3. Approximations of the minimum manipulating coalition size.
In this section, we formulate the coalitional manipulation problem as an integer linear program. We then show,
via a series of simplifying steps, that this is well approximated by a much simpler linear program in which there are
only two variables, and in which the constraint set does not depend on the voting situation, but only on the voting
rule. Since the proofs involved are fairly lengthy, we summarize the steps involved before embarking on them:
• The problem of assembling the smallest possible manipulating coalition can be expressed as an integer linear
program, in which the variables are the numbers of voters of each type (xt) to recruit;
• The integrality and upper bound (xt ≤ Nt) constraints of this program may be ignored (Propositions 4 and 5).
• Only manipulations in favour of the second-placegetter need be considered (Proposition 7).
• Coalition recruiting may be limited to those voters who rank the two leading candidates a and b adjacent, as
these voters are best able to manipulate (Proposition 8).
• We may find the minimum coalition size by considering only the members’ (sincere) rankings of a and b, without
regard to how they rank other candidates (Propositions 9 and 10). This reduces the problem to a mere linear
program with m− 1 variables and two constraints.
• Replacing this linear program with its dual gives us two variables and m− 1 constraints.
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To specify an attempted coalitional manipulation, we must specify for each t ∈ T the number xt of coalition
members of (sincere preference) type t, as well as the number yt of coalition members who will insincerely vote t. Of
course, we must have
∑
t∈T xt =
∑
t∈T yt.
Proposition 3 suggests that it will be enough to consider manipulation only at profiles (or voting situations) for
which there is a clear winner a (i.e. a candidate with |a| > |α| for each α 6= a). For such profiles, we will consider a
manipulation attempt successful if it results in the score of another candidate (or tied group of candidates) matching
or exceeding the score of a.
For a coalition to successfully manipulate in favour of a candidate β, its members must all be of types which
prefer β to a. Let T¯βa ⊆ T be the set of such types.
Additionally, it is clear that the coalition members need only consider insincere votes of types which rank β in
first place; this is a dominant strategy for such manipulations. Let Tβ be the set of such types.
Let MCS be the minimum size of a successful manipulating coalition (or ∞ if no manipulation is possible).
Then in the light of Proposition 3 and the above remarks we have
P (MCS = minβ 6=aQ1(β))→ 1
where Q1(β) is the optimal value of the linear program
min
∑
t∈T¯βa
xt
s.t.
∑
t∈Tβ
yt(1 − σt(α)) −
∑
t∈T¯βa
xt(σt(β)− σt(α)) ≥ |α| − |β| ∀α 6= β
∑
t∈Tβ
yt =
∑
t∈T¯βa
xt,
0 ≤ xt ≤ Nt ∀t ∈ T¯βa
yt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ Tβ
xt, yt ∈ Z
(1)
(or ∞ if (1) is infeasible).
We now aim to show that, for IC asymptotic purposes, we may drop the constraints xt ≤ Nt and xt, yt ∈ Z in
(1). This is as we should expect: each Nt will be about n/m!, while the differences between candidates’ scores (and
hence, presumably, coalition sizes) are only of order
√
n. Similarly, the requirement that xt and yt be integral should
not be much of a hindrance when dealing with large numbers of voters.
To this end, consider Q2(β), defined in the same way as Q1(β), except that we drop the integrality constraints
xt, yt ∈ Z in (1), and replace the constraint xt ≤ Nt by xt ≤ Nt −K, where K is a constant that depends only on
the voting rule. It will be convenient to choose
K =
{
2m!(1− wm−1)−1, if wm−1 < 1
0, if wm−1 = 1.
Define Q3(β) in the same way as Q2(β), except that the upper bound constraint on xt is dropped entirely. Note that
we have Q3(β) ≤ Q1(β) and Q3(β) ≤ Q2(β).
Proposition 4.
P (Q2(β) = Q3(β))→ 1 as n→∞.
Proof. Define f0 : R
T → [0,∞] as follows: for q ∈ RT , f0(q) is the optimal value of the linear program
min
∑
t∈T¯βa
xt
s.t.
∑
t∈Tβ
yt(1− σt(α)) −
∑
t∈T¯βa
xt(σt(β) − σt(α)) ≥
∑
t∈T
qt(σt(α) − σt(β)) ∀α 6= β
∑
t∈Tβ
yt =
∑
t∈T¯βa
xt,
xt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T¯βa
yt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ Tβ
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Then Q3(β) = f0(N). Note that f0(λq + µe) = λf0(q) for any q ∈ RT , λ ≥ 0, and µ ∈ R. Also, f0 is continuous on
the closed subset K = {q : f0(q) <∞} of RT . Let pi : RT → K be the projection which maps each point q ∈ RT to
the nearest point of K to q; then pi is continuous and pi(λq + µe) = λpi(q) + µe for any q ∈ RT , λ ≥ 0, and µ ∈ R.
Let f : RT → [0,∞) be given by f(q) = f0(pi(q)). Then f is continuous; has f(λq+µe) = λf(q) for any q ∈ RT ,
λ ≥ 0, and µ ∈ R; and Q3(β) = f(N) whenever Q3(β) <∞.
When Q3(β) =∞, we have Q2(β) =∞ too. On the other hand, when Q3(β) ≤ mintNt −K, the corresponding
optimal point of the linear program for Q3(β) is also feasible for the linear program for Q2(β), so Q2(β) = Q3(β).
Hence
{Q2(β) 6= Q3(β)} ⊆ {mintNt −K < Q3(β) <∞} ⊆ {mintNt −K < f(N)} ,
and so it suffices to show that this last event has probability converging to 0.
Now define h : RT → (−∞,∞) by h(q) = (mintqt)− f(q). By Proposition 1 and the continuity of h, we have
h
(
N − ne√
n
)
→D h(X), where X ∼ N(0,Σ).
This yields
(mintNt)− f(N)− n/m!√
n
→D h(X),
from which
lim
n
P
(
(mintNt)− f(N)− n/m!√
n
≤ −λ
)
≤ P (h(X) ≤ −λ)
for any λ > 0. That is,
lim
n
P
(
(mintNt)−K − f(N) ≤ n/m!− λ
√
n−K) ≤ P (h(X) ≤ −λ) .
We have n/m!− λ√n−K > 0 for sufficiently large n, so
lim
n
P ((mintNt)−K ≤ f(N)) ≤ P (h(X) ≤ −λ) .
Since λ was arbitrary,
P ((mintNt)−K ≤ f(N))→ 0 as n→∞,
and the result follows.
Proposition 5. With probability 1,
Q1(β) ≤ Q2(β) +K.
Proof of Proposition 5 for the case wm−1 < 1. Let (xt)t∈T¯βa , (yt)t∈Tβ be optimal for the problem defining Q2(β).
Then ∑
t∈Tβ
yt(1− σt(α))−
∑
t∈T¯βa
xt(σt(β)− σt(α)) ≥ |α| − |β| ∀α 6= β
∑
t∈Tβ
yt =
∑
t∈T¯βa
xt,
0 ≤ xt ≤ Nt −K ∀t ∈ T¯βa
yt ≥ 0. ∀t ∈ Tβ
Choose types t0 ∈ T¯βa, t1 ∈ Tβ such that t0 ranks a last, β next-to-last, and some γ first, while t1 is obtained from
t0 by transposing the rankings of β and γ. Define (x
′
t)t∈T¯βa , (y
′
t)t∈Tβ by x
′
t0 = xt0 +K, y
′
t1 = yt1 +K, and x
′
t = xt
and y′t = yt for all other t. Then (x
′
t), (y
′
t) satisfy∑
t∈Tβ
y′t(1− σt(α)) −
∑
t∈T¯βa
x′t(σt(β)− σt(α))
=
∑
t∈Tβ
yt(1− σt(α)) −
∑
t∈T¯βa
xt(σt(β) − σt(α)) +K(1− wm−1) +K(σt0(α)− σt1(α))
≥ |α| − |β|+ 2m!
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for each α 6= β. Also, ∑t∈Tβ y′t =∑t∈T¯βa x′t and 0 ≤ x′t ≤ Nt for each t.
Now obtain (x
′′
t )t∈T¯βa , (y
′′
t )t∈Tβ by rounding each x
′
t, y
′
t to an integral value. The choice between rounding up
and rounding down (i.e. between x
′′
t = ⌊x′t⌋ and x
′′
t = ⌈x′t⌉) can be made arbitrarily, but should be done in such a
way that
∑
t∈Tβ
y
′′
t =
∑
t∈T¯βa
x
′′
t . Since
∣∣∣x′′t − x′t∣∣∣ ≤ 1 and ∣∣∣y′′t − y′t∣∣∣ ≤ 1, we obtain∑
t∈Tβ
y
′′
t (1 − σt(α)) −
∑
t∈T¯βa
x
′′
t (σt(β)− σt(α)) ≥ |α| − |β|,
and so (x
′′
t ), (y
′′
t ) are feasible for (1). We have
∑
t∈T¯βa
x
′′
t =
∑
t∈T¯βa
xt + K, from which it follows that Q1(β) ≤
Q2(β) +K.
Proof of Proposition 5 for the case wm−1 = 1. A separate proof is required for this case (the anti-plurality rule
w = (1, . . . , 1, 0)). We can show that Q1(β) ≤ Q2(β) by showing that the optimal (xt), (yt) for the problem defining
Q2(β) are always integral (and hence give a feasible solution to (1)). To establish this, we will use a well-known
result in linear programming (see, e.g. [10] or [11]), which assures us that the optimal solution of a linear program
will always be integral when the constraint coefficient matrix A is totally unimodular (i.e. every square submatrix
has determinant 1, −1, or 0).
A useful sufficient condition for total unimodularity is given in [10] (Theorem 13.3) as follows: a matrix whose
entries are all 1, −1, or 0 is totally unimodular if each column has at most two non-zero entries, and if the rows can
be partitioned into two sets I1 and I2 such that: (i) if a column has two entries of the same sign, their rows are in
different sets; (ii) if a column has two entries of different signs, their rows are in the same set.
For this problem A has columns corresponding to the variables xt (t ∈ T¯βa) and yt (t ∈ Tβ). There is one row
corresponding to each candidate α 6= β, in which the entry in the column corresponding to xt is −1 if t ranks α last,
and 0 otherwise; the entry in the column corresponding to yt is 1 if t ranks α last, and 0 otherwise. Let these rows
constitute the set I1. There is also a further row corresponding to the constraint
∑
t∈Tβ
yt −
∑
t∈T¯βa
xt = 0; in this
row, the entries in the columns corresponding to the xt are all −1, and those corresponding to the yt are all 1. Let
this row constitute the set I2. It is clear that this matrix satisfies the sufficient condition above; the result follows.
Corollary 6.
P (|MCS −minβ 6=aQ3(β)| ≤ K)→ 1 as n→∞
Proof. From Propositions 4 and 5 we have
P (Q1(β)−K ≤ Q2(β) ≤ Q3(β) ≤ Q1(β))→ 1 as n→∞,
from which
P (|Q1(β) −Q3(β)| ≤ K)→ 1 as n→∞,
and so
P (|minβ 6=aQ1(β) −minβ 6=aQ3(β)| ≤ K)→ 1 as n→∞.
The result then follows from the earlier observation that P (MCS = minβ 6=aQ1(β))→ 1 .
Now that we have effectively eliminated, for our purposes, the integrality and upper-bound constraints in (1), we
can further simplify the description of the minimum manipulating coalition size.
Suppose b is the candidate with second-highest score after a. The next result consists of the observation that
only manipulations in favour of b need now be considered.
Proposition 7. minβ 6=aQ3(β) = Q3(b).
Proof. Let (xt)t∈T¯βa , (yt)t∈Tβ be optimal for the problem defining Q3(β), some β 6= b. Form (x′t)t∈T¯βa , (y′t)t∈Tβ by
transposing β and b in all the voter types involved. (So if types s and t are related by transposition of the ranks of
β and b, then x′s = xt.) We have, for any α,∑
t∈Tb
y′t(1− σt(α)) −
∑
t∈T¯ba
x′t(σt(b)− σt(α)) =
∑
t∈Tβ
yt(1− σt(α)) −
∑
t∈T¯βa
xt(σt(β)− σt(α)).
Since |β| ≤ |b|, we see that (x′t), (y′t) are feasible for the problem defining Q3(b), and give the same objective value.
The result follows.
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We next show that a manipulating coalition may always be formed by recruiting only voters who sincerely rank
b and a adjacent. Let Ti ⊂ T consist of those types which rank b in ith place and a in (i + 1)st place, and
Tba = ∪m−1i=1 Ti ⊂ T¯ba. If we replace T¯ba by Tba in the linear program defining Q3(b), we obtain the linear program
min
∑
t∈Tba
xt
s.t.
∑
t∈Tb
yt(1− σt(α)) −
∑
t∈Tba
xt(σt(b)− σt(α)) ≥ |α| − |b| ∀α 6= b
∑
t∈Tb
yt =
∑
t∈Tba
xt,
xt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ Tba
yt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ Tb
(2)
Let Q denote the optimal value of (2) (or ∞ if (2) is infeasible).
Proposition 8. Q3(b) = Q.
Proof. For t ∈ Ti, let τ(t) ⊆ T¯ba consist of those types which (i) agree with t in ranking positions i + 1, . . . ,m; and
(ii) rank the remaining candidates, other than b, in either the same position as t does, or one place lower. Observe
that {τ(t) : t ∈ Tba} is a partition of T¯ba, and that for s ∈ τ(t), α 6= b
σt(b)− σt(α) ≤ σs(b)− σs(α).
(This implies that a voter of type s ∈ τ(t) can always be dismissed from the manipulating coalition and replaced
with one of type t.)
Let (xt)t∈T¯ba , (yt)t∈Tb be optimal for the problem defining Q3(b). Form (x
′
t)t∈Tba by x
′
t =
∑
s∈τ(t) xs. Then∑
t∈Tba
x′t =
∑
s∈T¯ba
xs, and ∑
t∈Tba
x′t(σt(b)− σt(α) ≤
∑
s∈T¯ba
xs(σs(b)− σs(α)).
Hence (x′t) is feasible for (2). The result follows.
Our efforts thus far have established that P (|MCS −Q| ≤ K) → 1 as n → ∞. This will ensure that for IC
asymptotic purposes, we may replace our original description of the minimum manipulating coalition size with the
more tractable problem (2). Our next step results in a considerable further simplification of the linear program.
Theorem 9. Suppose non-negative numbers z1, . . . , zm−1 satisfy
m−1∑
i=1
zi(1− wi + wi+1) ≥ |a| − |b|
m−1∑
i=1
zi(1 − wi) ≥ nw¯ − |b|
(3)
where w¯ = (w1 + · · ·+ wm)/m. Then there exists (xt)t∈Tba , (yt)t∈Tb feasible for (2), with
∑
t∈Ti
xt = zi.
Remark. The conclusion of this result asserts that we may arrange a successful manipulation in which zi members
of the coalition are of types in Ti, for each i = 1, . . . ,m− 1.
Note that if zi voters of types in Ti all cast insincere votes which rank b first, the score of b will be increased by
zi(1 − wi). If they all cast insincere votes which rank a last, the score of a will be decreased by ziwi+1. Thus, the
first inequality of (3) makes it possible for b to catch up to a. The second inequality of (3) makes it possible for b to
catch up to the average candidate’s score. It is remarkable that these two (apparently rather weak) linear conditions
are sufficient to make manipulation possible.
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Proof. Let D be the set of candidates other than a or b. For any type t ∈ T , we denote by t(i) the candidate ranked
in ith place by t.
We will write our proposed (xt), (yt) in terms of parameters r and (uα)α∈D, which are to be determined later
in such a way that 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, uα ≥ 0 ∀α, and
∑
α∈D uα = 1.
For each α ∈ D, let
vα =
{
1−uα
m−3 , if m ≥ 4
1 , if m = 3;
note
∑
α∈D vα = 1.
For each t, let xt =
∑4
k=1 x
(k)
t and yt =
∑4
k=1 t
(k)
t , where
x
(1)
t =
{ rut(m)zi
(m−3)! , if t ∈ Ti, i = 1, . . . ,m− 2
0 , if t ∈ Tm−1
y
(1)
t =
{∑m−2
i=1
rut(i+1)zi
(m−3)! , if t ∈ Tb with t(m) = a
0 , otherwise
(this corresponds to ruαzi voters of types in Ti changing sincere votes of form . . . ba . . . α to insincere ones b . . . α . . . a,
for each i = 1, . . . ,m− 2);
x
(2)
t =
{
(1−r)vt(1)zi
(m−3)! , if t ∈ Ti, i = 2, . . . ,m− 2
0 , if t ∈ T1 ∪ Tm−1
y
(2)
t =
{
(1−r)vt(i)zi
(m−3)! , if t ∈ Tb with t(i + 1) = a, i = 2, . . . ,m− 2
0 , otherwise
(this corresponds to (1 − r)vαzi voters of types in Ti changing sincere votes of form α . . . ba . . . to insincere ones
b . . . αa . . ., for each i = 2, . . . ,m− 2);
x
(3)
t = y
(3)
t =
{
(1−r)z1
(m−2)! , if t ∈ T1
0 , otherwise;
(this corresponds to (1− r)z1 voters of types in T1 leaving their votes unchanged);
x
(4)
t =
{ vt(1)zm−1
(m−3)! , if t ∈ Tm−1
0 , if t /∈ Tm−1
y
(4)
t =
{ vt(m−1)zm−1
(m−3)! , if t ∈ Tb with t(m) = a
0 , otherwise
(this corresponds to vαzm−1 voters of types in Tm−1 changing sincere votes of form α . . . ba to insincere ones b . . . αa).
The reader may verify that
∑
t∈Ti
xt =
4∑
k=1
∑
t∈Ti
x
(k)
t = zi and
∑
t∈Tb
yt =
4∑
k=1
∑
t∈Tb
y
(k)
t =
m−1∑
i=1
zi.
We now verify that the inequality constraints of (2) hold. Note that
∑
t∈Tba
xtσt(b) =
m−1∑
i=1
ziwi,
∑
t∈Tba
xtσt(a) =
m−1∑
i=1
ziwi+1,
and ∑
t∈Tb
ytσt(a) =
4∑
k=1
∑
t∈Tb
y
(k)
t σt(a)
= 0 + (1− r)
m−2∑
i=2
ziwi+1 + (1− r)z1w2 + 0
= (1− r)
m−1∑
i=1
ziwi+1.
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Hence ∑
t∈Tb
yt(1 − σt(a))−
∑
t∈Tba
xt(σt(b)− σt(a)) = B + rA,
where A =
∑m−1
i=1 ziwi+1 and B =
∑m−1
i=1 zi(1 − wi). The inequality constraint for α = a in (2) thus reduces to
B + rA ≥ |a| − |b| .
Now consider the other inequality constraints. We use the notation w¯−i,j,k to denote the average of all elements
of w other than the ith, jth, and kth (i.e. (−wi − wj − wk +
∑m
ℓ=1 wℓ)/(m − 3)), or 0 if m = 3. Similarly
w¯−i,j = (−wi − wj +
∑m
ℓ=1 wℓ)/(m− 2). For α ∈ D we have∑
t∈Tba
xtσt(α) =
4∑
k=1
∑
t∈Tba
x
(k)
t σt(α)
= r
m−2∑
i=1
zi

uα · 0 +

∑
γ 6=α
uγ

 w¯−i,i+1,m


+ (1− r)
m−2∑
i=2
zi

vα · 1 +

∑
γ 6=α
vγ

 w¯−1,i,i+1


+ (1− r)z1w¯−1,2
+ zm−1

vα · 1 +

∑
γ 6=α
vγ

 w¯−1,m−1,m


and ∑
t∈Tb
ytσt(α) =
4∑
k=1
∑
t∈Tb
y
(k)
t σt(α)
= r
m−2∑
i=1
zi

uαwi+1 +

∑
γ 6=α
uγ

 w¯−1,i+1,m


+ (1− r)
m−2∑
i=2
zi

vαwi +

∑
γ 6=α
vγ

 w¯−1,i,i+1


+ (1− r)z1w¯−1,2
+ zm−1

vαwm−1 +

∑
γ 6=α
vγ

 w¯−1,m−1,m

 .
It follows that∑
t∈Tb
yt(1 − σt(α)) −
∑
t∈Tba
xt(σt(b)− σt(α)) =
m−1∑
i=1
zi − ruα
m−2∑
i=1
ziwi+1 + r(1 − uα)
m−2∑
i=1
zi(w¯−i,i+1,m − w¯−1,i+1,m)
+ (1− r)vα
m−2∑
i=2
zi(1− wi) + zm−1vα(1 − wm−1)−
m−1∑
i=1
ziwi
=
m−1∑
i=1
zi(1 − wi)− ruα
m−1∑
i=1
ziwi+1 + rvα
m−2∑
i=1
zi(1− wi)
+ (1− r)vα
m−2∑
i=1
zi(1− wi) + zm−1vα(1 − wm−1)
= (1 + vα)B − ruαA.
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The (xt), (yt) that we have constructed will thus satisfy the constraints required to be feasible for (2), provided r
and (uα) can be chosen in such a way that
B + rA ≥ |a| − |b|
(1 + vα)B − ruαA ≥ |α| − |b| ∀α ∈ D∑
α∈D
uα = 1
uα ≥ 0 ∀α ∈ D
0 ≤ r ≤ 1.
Suppose for the moment that m ≥ 4. Then the inequality required of uα may be written(
1 +
1− uα
m− 3
)
B − ruαA ≥ |α| − |b| ,
or (
rA+
B
m− 3
)
uα ≤ |b| − |α|+
(
m− 2
m− 3
)
B,
a simple upper bound on uα. Note that the upper bound is non-negative. For given r, it will be possible to choose
non-negative (uα) such that
∑
α∈D uα = 1 while complying with these upper bounds if and only if
∑
α∈D
(
|b| − |α|+
(
m− 2
m− 3
)
B
)
≥ rA+ B
m− 3 ,
or
rA ≤ (m− 2) |b| −
∑
α∈D
|α|+
(
(m− 2)2 − 1
m− 3
)
B,
that is
rA ≤ (m− 1)(|b|+B − nw¯) + |a| − nw¯, (∗)
using the fact that the sum of all the candidates’ scores is mnw¯.
Consider now the case m = 3. Then the sole α ∈ D has uα = vα = 1, and the inequality required of uα reduces
to
2B − rA ≥ |α| − |b| ,
which is (∗).
We have thus reduced our requirements to a condition on r ∈ [0, 1]:
|a| − |b| −B ≤ rA ≤ (m− 1)(|b|+B − nw¯) + (|a| − nw¯).
To see that there exists r ∈ [0, 1] satisfying this condition we note that, firstly,
(m− 1)(|b|+B − nw¯) + (|a| − nw¯) ≥ 0;
secondly,
|a| − |b| −B ≤ A
(from the first condition of (3)); and thirdly,
|a| − |b| −B ≤ (m− 1)(|b|+B − nw¯) + (|a| − nw¯).
This last condition can be simplified to
m(|b|+B − nw¯) ≥ 0,
the second condition of (3).
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Corollary 10. The linear program (2) has the same optimal value as the following one.
min
m−1∑
i=1
zi
s.t.
m−1∑
i=1
(1− wi + wi+1)zi ≥ |a| − |b|
m−1∑
i=1
(1− wi)zi ≥ nw¯ − |b|
zi ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1
(4)
Proof. Theorem 9 shows that for any feasible point of (4), there corresponds a feasible point of (2) with the
same objective value. Hence the optimal value of (2) cannot be greater than that of (4).
To show that the optimal value of (2) cannot be less than that of (4), suppose we have (xt)t∈Tba , (yt)t∈Tb feasible
for (2). Let zi =
∑
t∈Ti
xt. Then
∑m−1
i=1 zi =
∑
t∈Tba
xt, and we will show that (zi)
m−1
i=1 is feasible for (4). The
inequality for α = a in (2) says that
∑
t∈Tb
yt(1− σt(a)) ≥ |a| − |b|+
∑
t∈Tba
xt(σt(b)− σt(a)).
Noting that
∑
t∈Tb
ytσt(a) ≥ 0, we obtain
∑
t∈Tb
yt ≥ |a| − |b|+
m−1∑
i=1
∑
t∈Ti
xt(wi − wi+1)
and so
m−1∑
i=1
zi ≥ |a| − |b|+
m−1∑
i=1
(wi − wi+1)zi
from which the first constraint of (4) can be seen to hold.
If we add the inequalities in (2) for all α 6= b, we obtain
∑
t∈Tb
yt
∑
α6=b
(1− σt(α)) ≥

∑
α6=b
|α|

 − (m− 1)|b|+ ∑
t∈Tba
xt
∑
α6=b
(σt(b)− σt(α)),
or ∑
t∈Tb
yt
m−1∑
i=1
(1− wi) ≥ nmw¯ −m|b|+
m−1∑
i=1
∑
t∈Ti
xt
∑
j 6=i
(wi − wj),
which gives
(1− w¯)
m−1∑
i=1
zi ≥ nw¯ − |b|+
m−1∑
i=1
zi(wi − w¯),
from which the second constraint of (4) can be seen to hold.
Theorem 11. The linear programs (2) and (4) have the same objective value as the following one.
max (|a| − nw¯)λ+ (nw¯ − |b|)µ
s.t. wi+1λ+ (1− wi)µ ≤ 1 for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1
0 ≤ λ ≤ µ.
(5)
Also, (5) is unbounded if and only if (2) and (4) are infeasible.
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Proof. The linear program (4) has the same objective value as its dual program ([1, p. 251]):
max (|a| − |b|)λ + (nw¯ − |b|)λ′
s.t. (1− wi + wi+1)λ+ (1− wi)λ′ ≤ 1 for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1
λ ≥ 0, λ′ ≥ 0.
Substituting µ = λ+ λ′ yields (5).
Remark. We have now replaced our original description of the minimum manipulating coalition size with the simple
two-variable linear program (5). This will be exploited in the remaining sections of the paper.
4. IC asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size
The results of the previous section have established that
P (|MCS −Q| ≤ K)→ 1 as n→∞,
where
Q = max {λ(|a| − nw¯) + µ(nw¯ − |b|) : (λ, µ) ∈Mw}
and
Mw = {(λ, µ) : 0 ≤ λ ≤ µ and wi+1λ+ (1− wi)µ ≤ 1 for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1} .
Note in particular that the constraint set Mw does not depend on the voting situation, but only on the voting
rule. For a given rule, it is possible to identify the corresponding Mw (a two-dimensional linear polytope), and then
to identify the (finitely many) vertices of Mw which may achieve the optimum Q. This often leads to an explicit
expression for Q in terms of |a| and |b|.
Furthermore, we have (|a| , |b|) = (ρ1(S), ρ2(S)), where ρj(x) denotes the jth largest element of a vector x.
Proposition 2 gives us
(ρ1(S)− nw¯, nw¯ − ρ2(S))√
n
→D σw
(
m
m− 1
)1/2
(ρ1(Z)− Z¯, Z¯ − ρ2(Z)),
and so it follows that
Q√
n
→D Vw,
where
Vw = max
{
λ(ρ1(Z)− Z¯) + µ(Z¯ − ρ2(Z)) : (λ, µ) ∈ σw
(
m
m− 1
)1/2
Mw
}
.
Hence, too,
MCS√
n
→D Vw,
by the converging-together lemma ([5, p.91]). Consequently,
P
(
MCS ≤ v√n)→ gw(v) := P (Vw ≤ v) as n→∞.
That is, the asymptotic probability that the voting situation is manipulable by a coalition of v
√
n or fewer voters is
computable as a (non-decreasing) function of v. This function depends only on the voting rule.
A further observation will be helpful in determining which vertices of Mw may achieve the above maximum. If
x ∈ Rm has mean element x¯ = (x1 + · · ·+ xm)/m, then
ρ1(x) − x¯ ≥ 0 and − (ρ1(x) − x¯) ≤ x¯− ρ2(x) ≤ 1
m− 1(ρ1(x)− x¯).
We note in passing that for all rules other than the anti-plurality rule w = (1, . . . , 1, 0), Mw is a bounded set,
since the constraints defining it include (1 − wm−1)µ ≤ 1. Hence Vw is a finite-valued random variable. It follows
that P (MCS =∞) → 0 as n → ∞. For the anti-plurality rule itself, Mw is unbounded and Vw may take ∞ as a
value; see below for further detail.
12
The remainder of this section will be devoted to carrying out the above analysis for some common positional voting
rules.
Borda’s rule. wi = (m− i)/(m− 1) for i = 1, . . . ,m. The constraints defining Mw for this rule are
(m− 2)λ ≤ m− 1
(m− 3)λ+ µ ≤ m− 1
...
λ+ (m− 3)µ ≤ m− 1
(m− 2)µ ≤ m− 1
0 ≤ λ ≤ µ
Note that the point with λ = µ = (m − 1)/(m − 2) satisfies each of the constraints with equality. So Mw is the
triangle with vertices at (0, 0), (0, m−1m−2 ), and (
m−1
m−2 ,
m−1
m−2 ); the last of these always achieves the optimum Q. Thus, a
good approximation to the minimum manipulating coalition size is
Q =
(
m− 1
m− 2
)
(|a| − |b|).
For the corresponding asymptotic result, note that
σ2w =
m+ 1
12(m− 1) .
It then transpires that
MCS√
n
→D
(
m(m+ 1)
12(m− 2)2
)1/2
(ρ1(Z)− ρ2(Z)).
Anti-plurality rule: w = (1, . . . , 1, 0). The constraints defining Mw reduce to 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, µ ≥ λ. Thus
Q =
{ |a| − |b| , if |b| ≥ nw¯
∞, otherwise.
The corresponding asymptotic result is
MCS√
n
→D Vw =
{
m−1/2(ρ1(Z)− ρ2(Z)), if ρ2(Z) ≥ Z¯
∞, otherwise.
As a consequence of this, we can find the limiting probability that an anti-plurality election is invulnerable to
manipulation:
lim
n
P (MCS =∞) = P (Vw =∞) = P
(
ρ2(Z) < Z¯
)
.
The limit is positive, a property unique to anti-plurality. For all other positional rules, limn P (MCS =∞) = 0, a
result essentially contained in [7].
Plurality and k-approval rules: w = (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . 0) (with k 1s), where 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 2. The simple plurality rule is
included here as the case k = 1. The constraints defining Mw reduce to 0 ≤ λ ≤ µ ≤ 1, so Mw is the triangle with
vertices at (0, 0), (0, 1), and (1, 1); the last of these always achieves the optimum. Thus, our approximation of the
minimum manipulating coalition size is simply
Q = |a| − |b| .
While this expression is valid for all k-approval rules (1 ≤ k ≤ m − 2), different values of k will give rise to
different probability distributions for (|a| , |b|), and so different asymptotic results for MCS. We have w¯ = k/m and
σ2w = k(m− k)/m2, giving
MCS√
n
→D
(
k(m− k)
m(m− 1)
)1/2
(ρ1(Z)− ρ2(Z)).
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Three-candidate “easy case” rules: w = (1, 1−p, 0) where 1/2 ≤ p ≤ 1. This family includes the 3-candidate versions
of plurality voting (p = 1) and Borda’s rule (p = 1/2). The constraints defining Mw are 0 ≤ λ ≤ µ, (1−p)λ ≤ 1, and
pµ ≤ 1. Thus Mw is the triangle with vertices at (0, 0), (0, p−1), and (p−1, p−1); the last of these always achieves the
optimum. Thus
Q = p−1(|a| − |b|).
We have σ2w = 2(1− p+ p2)/9; it follows from this that
MCS√
n
→D
(
1− p+ p2
3p2
)1/2
(ρ1(Z)− ρ2(Z)).
Three-candidate “hard case” rules: w = (1, 1 − p, 0) where 0 < p ≤ 1/2. This family includes the remaining 3-
candidate positional rules not already considered. For these rules, Mw is the quadrilateral with vertices at (0, 0),
(0, p−1), ((1−p)−1, (1−p)−1), and (1−p)−1, p−1). In voting situations with |b| ≥ nw¯, the optimum for Q is achieved
at ((1 − p)−1, (1− p)−1); otherwise, (1− p)−1, p−1) is optimal. Thus
Q =
{
(1 − p)−1(|a| − |b|), if |b| ≥ nw¯
(1 − p)−1(|a| − nw¯) + p−1(nw¯ − |b|), if |b| ≤ nw¯
that is
Q = (1− p)−1(|a| − |b|) +
(
1
p
− 1
1− p
)
(nw¯ − |b|)+,
where x+ denotes max(x, 0). The corresponding asymptotic result is
MCS√
n
→D
(
1− p+ p2
3
)1/2((
1
1− p
)
(ρ1(Z)− ρ2(Z)) +
(
1
p
− 1
1− p
)
(Z¯ − ρ2(Z))+
)
.
Four-candidate rules. For m ≥ 4 it would be tedious to reduce all possible cases to asymptotic expressions of the
kind above. Instead, we have simply illustrated the sets σwMw for a variety of rules w in Figure 1. Note that σwMw
may have up to 3 optimal vertices. (For general m, σwMw might have up to m− 1 optimal vertices.)
The functions gw(v) = P (Vw ≤ v) for some common voting rules are shown in Figures 2, 3, and 4.
5. Comparisons between positional voting rules.
In this section we compare the various positional voting rules with respect to their manipulability under IC
asymptotic conditions.
It is apparent from Figure 2 that the susceptibility of voting rules to coalitional manipulation depends on the size
of the coalition involved. The graph for m = 3, for example, shows that elections using the plurality or Borda rules
are highly likely to be manipulable by a large coalition (at least 2
√
n voters), whereas only about half of anti-plurality
elections are so manipulable. But, if one is more concerned about manipulation by small groups, the graph shows
that plurality and anti-plurality elections are about equally susceptible to manipulation by coalitions of less than
0.25
√
n voters, while Borda is rather less susceptible.
This suggests that there will be no single rule which is clearly superior to all others with respect to IC coalitional
manipulation. However, some are clearly inferior to others. The asymptotic manipulation probability gw(v) for the
plurality rule, for example, is greater than for the other two 3-candidate rules shown for all values of v.
More formally, given two m-candidate positional voting rules w, w′, we will say that w dominates w′ (and write
w′  w) if gw(v) ≤ gw′(v) for all v ≥ 0. That is, w is less susceptible than w′ to manipulation by coalitions of any
given size. Alternatively, the asymptotic minimum coalition size Vw is larger than Vw′ in the sense of first-order
stochastic dominance.
Note that  gives a partial order on the rules. Although the present paper is concerned only with positional
rules, the partial order  could be defined in the same way for any voting rules.
If w′  w, then the rule w is to be preferred to w′. More generally, the best rules to use (at least from the point
of view of manipulation by IC populations) are those not dominated by any other.
Proposition 12. The plurality rule is always dominated.
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Figure 1: the sets σwMw for several four-candidate positional rules, depicted at consistent scales. The black
dots show which points may be optimal.
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Figure 2: the functions gw(v) = P (Vw ≤ v) for some three- and four-candidate voting rules.
Proof. Indeed, plurality is dominated both by anti-plurality and by Borda. This is apparent from the asymptotic
results of the previous section:
Vantiplurality =
{
m−1/2(ρ1(Z)− ρ2(Z)), if ρ2(Z) ≥ Z¯
∞, otherwise ,
while
Vplurality = m
−1/2(ρ1(Z)− ρ2(Z)),
giving Vplurality ≤ Vantiplurality and so (plurality)  (anti-plurality). Similarly for Borda.
Proposition 13. The anti-plurality rule is never dominated.
Proof. No other rule w may dominate the anti-plurality rule, because limv→∞ gantiplurality(v) = P
(
ρ2(Z) ≥ Z¯
)
< 1,
whereas limv→∞ gw(v) = 1.
Proposition 13 is true because the anti-plurality rule is resistant to manipulation by very large coalitions, in a way
that every other positional rule is not. However, as we shall see later, this advantage becomes very slight in elections
with 6 or more candidates.
Proposition 14. Borda’s rule is undominated for m ∈ {3, 4}, but dominated for m ≥ 5.
Proof. From the asymptotic results of the previous section:
VBorda =
(
m(m+ 1)
12(m− 2)2
)1/2
(ρ1(Z)− ρ2(Z)),
while
V⌊m/2⌋−approval =
(⌊m/2⌋ (m− ⌊m/2⌋)
m(m− 1)
)1/2
(ρ1(Z)− ρ2(Z)).
Note that for m ≥ 5,
⌊m/2⌋ (m− ⌊m/2⌋)
m(m− 1) ≥
(m− 1)(m+ 1)
4m(m− 1) = 3
(
1− 2
m
)2
m(m+ 1)
12(m− 2)2 ≥
m(m+ 1)
12(m− 2)2 .
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This gives VBorda ≤ V⌊m/2⌋−approval and so (Borda)  (⌊m/2⌋-approval).
Now let m ∈ {3, 4} and let w be any positional rule for m-candidate elections. We may observe that
Mw ⊆M ′w :=
{
(λ, µ) ∈ R2 : 0 ≤ λ ≤ bw, λ ≤ µ
}
,
where
bw = mini(1 − wi + wi+1)−1.
It is shown in [12] that the quantity σwbw is maximized, over all m-candidate positional rules, by Borda’s rule. (This
is true only when m ∈ {3, 4}; for m ≥ 5, the maximum value is achieved by the ⌊m/2⌋-approval rule.) From this we
obtain
gw(v) = P (Vw ≤ v)
≥ P (Vw ≤ v and ρ2(Z) ≥ Z¯)
≥ P
(
max
{
λ(ρ1(Z)− Z¯) + µ(Z¯ − ρ2(Z)) : (λ, µ) ∈
(
m
m− 1
)1/2
σwMw
}
≤ v and ρ2(Z) ≥ Z¯
)
≥ P
(
max
{
λ(ρ1(Z)− Z¯) + µ(Z¯ − ρ2(Z)) : (λ, µ) ∈
(
m
m− 1
)1/2
σwM
′
w
}
≤ v and ρ2(Z) ≥ Z¯
)
= P
((
m
m− 1
)1/2
σwbw(ρ1(Z)− ρ2(Z)) ≤ v and ρ2(Z) ≥ Z¯
)
≥ P
((
m
m− 1
)1/2
σBordabBorda(ρ1(Z)− ρ2(Z)) ≤ v and ρ2(Z) ≥ Z¯
)
= P
(
VBorda ≤ v and ρ2(Z) ≥ Z¯
)
= gBorda(v) − P
(
VBorda ≤ v and ρ2(Z) < Z¯
)
.
Let c = (m/(m− 1))1/2σBordabBorda. Since all orderings of Z = (Z1, . . . , Zm) are equally likely,
P
(
VBorda ≤ v and ρ2(Z) < Z¯
)
= m!P
(
Z1 ≥ Z2 ≥ · · · ≥ Zm, c(Z1 − Z2) ≤ v, and Z2 < Z¯
)
≤ m!P (0 ≤ Z¯ − Z2 ≤ Z1 − Z2 ≤ v/c)
= m!
∫ v/c
0
∫ x
0
f(x, y) dxdy
≤ 1
2
m!(sup f)
(v
c
)2
= O(v2) as v → 0,
where f is the (non-degenerate) bivariate normal probability density of (Z1 − Z2, Z¯ − Z2). It follows that
g′w(0) ≥ g′Borda(0),
and hence that w cannot dominate Borda.
The argument used in Proposition 14 shows that among all positional rules for three- or four- candidate elections,
Borda’s rule has the g function with the smallest derivative at the origin. This means that it is the most resistant to
manipulation by very small coalitions. However, this property does not hold when there are five or more candidates.
In that case, it is the ⌊m/2⌋-approval rule which enjoys maximal resistance to manipulation by very small coalitions.
These results are similar to those of [12], although the criterion considered there is the “average threshhold coalition
size” rather than the minimum manipulating coalition size of the present paper.
Figures 2–4 show the manipulability of the rules for particular numbers of candidates. We see from Figures 2 and
3 that for m = 4, 5, 6 there is not much difference in the manipulability of the common rules, at least by comparison
with the differences evident when m = 3. In the graph for m = 5 we can see the Borda rule being dominated (by
2-approval) for the first time. Also worth noting is that for m ≥ 5 there is very little difference between plurality and
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Figure 3: the functions gw(v) = P (Vw ≤ v) for some five- and six-candidate voting rules.
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Figure 4: the functions gw(v) = P (Vw ≤ v) for some ten- and twenty-candidate voting rules.
18
anti-plurality from a manipulation point of view. Anti-plurality has a slight additional chance of resisting attack by
a large coalition – and on this basis dominates plurality – but this advantage has become almost imperceptible by
m = 6.
Figure 4 shows the behaviour of the rules when there are many candidates. In this figure, the curves for the anti-
plurality rule have been left out, as they are indistinguishable from those for plurality. We see the ⌊m/2⌋-approval
rule dominating the others. It should be noted, though, that the IC hypothesis is possibly unconvincing when applied
to elections with many candidates, as it assumes in effect that all candidates are about equally popular.
6. Conclusions.
The technique presented in this paper makes it possible to compute the (IC) limiting probability distribution of
the minimum manipulating coalition size for any positional rule, with any number of candidates.
The consideration of coalition sizes is especially useful when comparing the rules. Some rules are especially
resistant to manipulation by small coalitions, while others fare better with respect to manipulation by large coalitions.
Previous work has made this distinction in a rather limited way, by considering “individual” and “coalitional”
manipulation (the latter meaning that the coalition may be of any size). But these extremes may be somewhat
uninformative. Given a large voter population, all positional rules (except anti-plurality) are highly likely to be
manipulable by some coalition, and highly unlikely to be manipulable by any individual. Studying coalitions of
intermediate sizes starts to reveal more differences between the rules.
The picture also changes when the number of candidates is varied. Much previous work has concentrated on
the three-candidate case, for which the behaviour of the rules is quite different (Borda is least susceptible to small-
coalition manipulation, anti-plurality to large-coalition manipulation). The four-candidate case is similar, except
that the differences between rules are smaller. But when there are five candidates, it appears that all positional rules
are about equally manipulable, across the whole range of coalition sizes, and there is not much to choose between
them. With six or more candidates, the ⌊m/2⌋-approval rules emerge as favourites.
Another, perhaps surprising, conclusion is that for m ≥ 5 there is very little difference between plurality and
anti-plurality from a manipulation point of view. The approximate symmetry between these rules does not appear
when m = 3, and so does not appear to have been noticed before (although it was recognized in a more limited sense
already in [14]).
It would be possible in principle to produce results like those in this paper for the IAC voter behaviour model.
However, the technique of analysis would have to be quite different. Rather than reducing the probabilities to those
involving normal distributions, the calculations would entail the computation of convex volumes, as outlined in [16].
It would also be of interest to produce limiting distributions similar to those in this paper (or at least, graphs
like those in Figures 2–4) for voting rules other than positional rules. Approval voting ([2]) would be an especially
attractive target. However, this too would require new techniques.
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